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BOMBS OVER BAGHDAD: ADDRESSING 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF A 
U.S. PRESIDENT FOR ACTS OF WAR* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Brief History 
On March 19, 2003, the United States, in cooperation with Great 
Britain,1 launched Operation Iraqi Freedom and declared war against Iraq.2 
Although Congress authorized the use of force,3 both critics within the 
United States4 and the international community questioned the legality of 
such an invasion.5 Additionally, during the ensuing U.S. occupation of 
Iraq, various violations of both international and treaty law have been 
alleged against the United States,6 including serious allegations of 
systematic torture of Iraqis in the Abu Ghraib prison.7 
 
 1. Official White House Website, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Members (Mar. 21, 
2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-4.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2005). While the United States and Great Britain composed the majority of the coalition, both in terms 
of military and financial resources, forty-six other nations were recognized as part of the coalition as of 
March 21, 2003. These other members provided support ranging from fly-over rights to direct military 
participation. Id. 
 2. American Friends Service Committee, Iraq War Timeline, http://www.afsc.org/iraq/guide/ 
war-timeline.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2005). 
 3. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
243, 116 Stat. 1498. This law gave the President the power to  
use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in 
order to—(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat 
posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.  
Id. See also Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(authorizing the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against the nations or 
organizations who helped plan or execute the September 11, 2001 attacks on America or against any 
nations that have given harbor to those organizations). 
 4. Former Pentagon advisor Richard Perle stated, “international law . . . would have required us 
to leave Saddam Hussein alone . . . [There was] no practical mechanism consistent with the rules of the 
UN for dealing with Saddam Hussein.” Oliver Burkeman & Julian Borger, War Critics Astonished as 
US Hawk Admits Invasion was Illegal, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Nov. 20, 2003, http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/uk_news/story/10,,1089042,00.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 
 5. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, when asked by reporters whether the war was illegal, 
replied, “Yes . . . I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN Charter . . . and from the Charter 
point of view it was illegal.” U.N. News Service, Lessons of Iraq War Underscore Importance of UN 
Charter—Annan (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.un.org/apps/news (search “News By Date: Advanced 
Search” hyperlink for September 16, 2004 and Iraq+War+Charter; then follow hyperlink to article) 
[hereinafter Annan Statement] (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).  
 6. The Center for Economic and Social Rights lists ten different “categories” of violations of 
international occupation law committed by U.S. forces, including, inter alia, “unlawful detention and 
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B. Scope of Discussion 
This Note will focus on the potential criminal liability of a U.S. 
President for illegal acts of war and will do so through the application of 
relevant law to the actions taken in Iraq by the George W. Bush 
administration.8 Any discussion of civil liability under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act9 or the Torture Victim Protection Act10 is beyond this Note’s 
scope, as is any analysis of a potential court-martial11 of the President in 
his role as Commander in Chief of the U.S. military.12 
Further, this Note will discuss liability for violations of the President’s 
constitutional duty,13 U.S. criminal statutes,14 treaty law,15 and customary 
torture,” “failure to ensure vital services,” and “fundamentally changing the economy.” CTR. FOR 
ECON. AND SOC. RTS., BEYOND TORTURE: U.S. VIOLATIONS OF OCCUPATION LAW IN IRAQ 4–5 
(2004), http://cesr.org/filestore2/download/730. 
 7. Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST, May 21, 
2004, at A1 (stating that detainees at Abu Ghraib describe abuse that goes well beyond what has been 
made public, adding allegations of prisoners being ridden like animals, sexually fondled by female 
soldiers and forced to retrieve their food from toilets). See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND 
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB AND THE WAR ON TERROR (New York Review Books 2004) (offering 
a more detailed look at the Abu Ghraib situation, including background and legal analysis).  
 This Note will proceed under the assumption that the allegations are true and will turn to the 
application of laws to such allegations. 
 8. As such, this Note is more an exercise in the theoretical application of laws that might be 
used to prosecute a sitting United States President and less an indictment of this specific 
administration. 
 9. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2003) (granting original jurisdiction to the 
district courts for any action initiated by an alien seeking redress for a tort “in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States”). 
 10. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2003) (providing remedy in civil 
suit against “[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority . . . of any foreign nation . . . 
subjects an individual to torture . . . or . . . extrajudicial killing . . .”). 
 11. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2000) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
which is the controlling law for any court-martial action).  
 12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 13. Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
 14. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441(a) (Supp. 2005) (“Whoever . . . commits a war 
crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject 
to the penalty of death.”); Id. § 2340A(a) (explaining that “[w]hoever outside the United States 
commits or attempts to commit torture” is subject to fine, imprisonment, or, in some cases, the death 
penalty). 
 15. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3–5 (stating that all members must settle disputes peacefully, 
refrain from the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity” of any state, and assist the U.N. 
in any actions it undertakes against a state); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 3, 146, 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Geneva-Civilian] (delineating basic protections for civilians in a war environment and detailing that 
which constitutes a “grave breach” of the treaty); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 3, 4, 129–131, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva-POW] (delineating basic protections for prisoners of war and detailing what constitutes a 
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international law.16 Additionally, this Note will address these breaches in 
terms of direct responsibility or, where applicable, through the doctrine of 
superior responsibility.17 Such analysis will take place with respect to 
three different fora: U.S. federal courts, under constitutional or statutory 
grants of jurisdiction;18 Iraqi courts, under the laws of the interim 
government;19 and a third party state, under universal jurisdiction.20 
“grave breach” of the treaty). 
 16. See generally Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See also Rome Statute for 
International Criminal Court, arts. 25(3)(b), 27, 28(b)(i-iii), July 17, 1998, [hereinafter Rome Statute], 
reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 
206-21 (Carolina Academic Press 2000); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I], reprinted in PAUST, supra, at 124-35. All three are considered 
codifications of customary international law; thus they pertain even in situations where one or both 
states in a conflict are not a party to the treaty. See generally Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-A (1996); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704/1993 (May 3, 1993); JEFFERY L. DUNOFF 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 74–75, 535, 544 (2002) (listing the two 
components of customary international law as state practice and opinio juris, stating that over 150 
countries are party to Protocol I, and detailing the Final Report to the Prosecutor regarding the NATO 
bombing campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in light of the obligations imposed by 
Protocol I). 
 17. As it has most recently been applied in the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the doctrine of superior responsibility allows for the prosecution of military 
commanders and civilians for the actions of subordinates, over whom they held effective control, when 
they knew or had reason to know that their subordinates had committed or were planning to commit 
violations of the law of war and they failed to prevent or punish such violations. See, e.g., Prosecutor 
v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment (Feb. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/cel-aj010220.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/cel-tj981116e.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 
2005). 
 For a more in-depth treatment of this doctrine, see Damien S. Donnelly-Cole, Application of the 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Delalic (Dec. 17, 2004) (unpublished seminar paper, Wash. Univ. School of 
Law) (on file with the author). 
 18. The Constitution grants jurisdiction to the federal courts in “all Cases . . . arising under the 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their authority.” U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Additionally, “[t]here is jurisdiction over [someone accused of committing torture] 
where (1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (Supp. 2005); as 
well as jurisdiction where “the person committing such war crime . . . is a national of the United 
States.” War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441. 
 19. “Federal courts shall adjudicate matters that arise from the application of federal laws.” LAW 
OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD [2004] art. 43, § D, 
entered into force Mar. 8, 2004, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2005) [hereinafter INTERIM CONSTITUTION]. “The judiciary shall enjoy exclusive 
competence to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused pursuant to law.” Id. art. 43, § A. 
 20. Briefly, universal jurisdiction exists when the crime is of such a nature as to be violative of a 
jus cogens peremptory norm. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligato 
Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 65–67 (1996) [hereinafter Jus Cogens]. In a situation 
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II. FORUM ONE: U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
The President is under a legal obligation to faithfully execute the laws 
of the United States.21 This obligation extends both to treaties made under 
the Constitution22 and statutory law.23 Failure to uphold these laws is 
prosecutable in U.S. federal courts under jurisdiction granted by the 
Constitution.24 
The discussion of prosecution in U.S. federal courts will address 
potential claims of presidential immunity, violations of Constitutionally-
imposed duties and potential violations of statutory law. 
A. Dealing with Issues of Immunity 
The line of Supreme Court cases concerning presidential immunity 
from criminal liability has evinced an apparent trend in favor of allowing 
service and prosecution.25 In 1974, the Supreme Court addressed President 
Nixon’s claim of immunity in the face of a subpoena duces tecum.26 In 
United States v. Nixon, the Court held that it “is the province and duty of 
[the Supreme Court] ‘to say what the law is’ with respect to the claim of 
privilege.”27 The Court further stated that “neither the doctrine of 
separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level 
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified 
Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all 
where such a norm is violated, states have the right and the duty to prosecute or extradite the violators 
within their borders. Id. at 66. 
 The lack of the International Criminal Court or a U.N.-sanctioned tribunal as a possible forum for 
prosecution is not an oversight. The International Criminal Court may only exercise jurisdiction over 
the citizen of a non-State party with consent from the defendant’s home state, which the United States 
would never give in a situation such as this. See Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the 
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 78 
(stating that “a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction [is] that either the territorial state or the 
state of nationality of the accused be parties to the court’s statute or give special consent to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.”). Likewise, because the United States has a veto on the U.N. Security 
Council and any tribunal would have to start in the Security Council, it is unlikely that such a court 
could ever be created. See U.N. Charter art. 23(1) (naming the United States as one of the permanent 
members of the Security Council), art. 27(3) (requiring all permanent members to vote affirmatively in 
all non-procedural matters), and art. 29 (allowing Security Council to create “such subsidiary organs as 
it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl.1. 
 22. See infra notes 38–43. 
 23. See infra notes 89–123 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 26–36 and accompanying text. 
 26. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 27. Id. at 705 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
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circumstances”28 because such an “absolute, unqualified privilege . . . 
would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III.”29 
Eight years later, the Supreme Court carved out a very limited 
exception to this rule in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.30 Addressing the issue of civil 
tort damages, the Court held that “petitioner, as a former President of the 
United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability 
predicated on his official acts.”31 This exception should not be read more 
broadly than its precise language indicates; however, as the Court was 
careful to reiterate, “[i]t is settled law that the separation-of-powers 
doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction.”32 
A more recent decision—and the one most germane to the discussion 
in this Note—regarding Presidential immunity was handed down in 1997 
in Clinton v. Jones.33 In Clinton, the Supreme Court declared, “we have 
long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the 
authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.”34 This 
decision further eviscerated any exception carved out in Fitzgerald by 
stating “the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal 
courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves 
office.”35 The Court was unambiguous as to the broad scope of this ruling, 
declaring that, “[i]f Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President 
stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation.”36 Absent 
any such congressional action, where the actions are determined by the 
Supreme Court to be illegal, the immunity granted to a sitting U.S. 
President does not protect him from service and the prosecution need not 
be stayed until the President is no longer in office. 
 28. Id. at 706. 
 29. Id. at 707. 
 30. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 31. Id. at 749 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 753–54 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708). The Court was narrowly 
divided on the issue of allowing absolute immunity even in this strictly defined exception. Three 
Justices joined Justice White’s dissent, stating that “[a]ttaching absolute immunity to the Office of the 
President, rather than to particular activities that the President might perform, places the President 
above the law.” Id. at 766 (White, J., dissenting). 
 33. 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 34. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703. 
 35. Id. at 705–06. 
 36. Id. at 709. 
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B. Violation of Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws of the 
United States 
The Constitution places upon the President the duty of ensuring that the 
laws of the United States be “faithfully executed.”37 Article VI further 
states that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”38 
The Supreme Court has interpreted Article VI, holding on numerous 
occasions that, where a valid treaty is not repugnant39 to the Constitution, 
it carries the same legal strength as the Constitution itself.40 Based on 
these principles, both the U.N. Charter, ratified by Congress in 1945,41 and 
the Geneva Conventions, ratified in 1955,42 are on equal legal footing with 
the U.S. Constitution, at least until Congress acts with the clear intent to 
supercede one or all of them.43 
1. The Charter of the United Nations 
The primary purpose of the United Nations is to “save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”44 by encouraging member states to 
“practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours.”45 To achieve this goal, the Charter of the United Nations 
(“U.N. Charter” or “Charter”) requires that all member states “shall settle 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 39. The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1870) (explaining “a treaty cannot change the 
Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument”). 
 40. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (citing Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 
(1887) (holding that “that the treaties made by the United States and in force are part of the supreme 
law of the land, and that they are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are 
elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United States”)). See also United States v. Forty-Three 
Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876) (quoting Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 
(1829) (holding that “a treaty is to be regarded, in courts of justice, as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature”)). 
 41. The United States was one of the original signatories to the U.N. Charter on June 26, 1945. 
The United States ratified the Charter on July 28, 1945, and the Charter entered into force on October 
24, 1945. U.S. Dep’t of State Online, United Nations, http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1937_ 
wwii/united_nations.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). 
 42. The United States signed the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and ratified them on 
August 2, 1955. ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 
available at http://www.aiipowmia.com/legis/protocoles.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 
 43. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 620 (explaining that “[a] treaty may supersede a prior act of 
Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty”). 
 44. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 45. Id. 
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their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”46 
Further, “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”47 It is difficult to reconcile the actions of 
the United States toward Iraq with the requirements imposed by the U.N. 
Charter. 
Even under the most liberal interpretation, the demand that Saddam 
Hussein relinquish power and leave Iraq or face military action48 was a 
“threat . . . of force against the . . . political independence” of Iraq.49 
Likewise, the ensuing invasion was inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations, as it was a use of force that endangered international 
peace.50 Such acts are illegal under the Charter.51 
The most obvious rebuttals to these allegations of illegality are that the 
U.N. Charter allows for “removal of threats to the peace”52 and, 
furthermore, that Article 42 of the Charter allows for the use of force when 
non-military actions against a country have failed.53 Additionally, the 
 46. Id. art. 2, para. 3. 
 47. Id. art. 2, para. 4. These “Purposes of the United Nations” are laid out in Article 1 of the 
Charter and include, inter alia,  
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace 
and “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination or peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace.” U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 1–2. 
 48. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 
2003) (“Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will 
result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.”), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) 
[hereinafter March 17 Remarks]. See also CNN, Bush Signs Iraq War Resolution (Oct. 17, 2002) 
(“[E]ither the Iraqi regime will give up its weapons of mass destruction, or for the sake of peace, the 
United States will lead a global coalition to disarm that regime.”) [hereinafter Bush Resolution], 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/16/bush.resolution/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  
 49. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 50. Id. art. 1, paras. 1-2. Such an invasion was also not in conformity with the U.N. goal of 
“develop[ing] friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
 51. See Annan Statement, supra note 5; Press Release, Int’l Progress Org., Declaration of the 
President of the I.P.O. (Mar. 15, 2003) (http://i-p-o.org/nr-iraq-un-eu-15march03.htm). 
 52. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 53. March 17 Remarks, supra note 48. President Bush proclaimed the failure of the Security 
Council resolutions as follows: 
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Charter states that it does not “impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations . . .”54 It could be argued, therefore, that either Article 41 
resolutions failed and the United States acted under Article 42 to remove a 
serious threat to international peace; or, alternatively, the United States 
attacked Iraq in self-defense due to either Iraq’s perceived ties to the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on America or preemptively, to keep Iraq 
from harming the United States in the future.55 Yet, neither of these 
arguments is persuasive. 
The duty to determine the existence of a threat to international peace 
and to decide what measures should be taken under Articles 41 and 42 
falls not to an individual Member State, but rather is the exclusive domain 
of the Security Council.56 As to a claim of self-defense, the language of the 
Charter unambiguously requires a direct attack upon the Member State.57 
However, in a speech by the President immediately prior to the war, he 
makes no mention of the potential military action against Iraq as one of 
self-defense in retaliation of a direct attack.58 Although the administration 
intimated during the build-up to the war that Iraq had some connection to 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on America by al Qaeda,59 this claim has 
been refuted by the findings of the 9/11 Commission, which stated that 
[o]n November 8th, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq 
in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully 
and immediately disarm. Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it 
will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power 
Id. Note, however, that U.N. Charter Articles 41 and 42 lay out a graduated enforcement scheme. 
Under Article 41, “[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures.” U.N. Charter art. 41. Article 42 then states that, “[s]hould the 
Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved inadequate, it may take such action . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 54. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 55. Bush Resolution, supra note 48. “The White House says Iraq is stockpiling chemical and 
biological weapons in violation of U.N. resolutions ending the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It also accuses 
Iraq of resuming efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, and argues that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein could 
give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.” Id. 
 56. “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace . . . and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 57. See Annan Statement, supra note 5. 
 58. March 17 Remarks, supra note 48. The President mentioned a possible future threat to the 
United States as a reason for the invasion, but did not allege any direct attack by Iraq upon the United 
States. 
 59. See, e.g., The Associated Press, Bush Overstated Iraq Links to al-Qaeda, Former Intelligence 
Officials Say, USA TODAY, July 13, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/ 
2003-07-13-bush-alqaeda_x.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
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Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden “do not appear to have [had] a 
collaborative relationship.”60 
As such, a claim can be made that the President acted in direct 
contravention to the requirements imposed by the U.N. Charter. Such 
contravention would amount to a failure by the President to faithfully 
execute the laws of the United States, which would then be criminally 
punishable under Article III of the Constitution, as it arises “under this 
Constitution . . . and Treaties made.”61 
2. The Geneva Conventions 
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War62 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War63 (collectively, “The Geneva Conventions”) 
proscribe similar activities against protected persons during an 
international armed conflict, most notably torture64 and inhuman 
treatment.65 Additionally, both share a common Article 3,66 outlawing 
“violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture”67 and “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”68 
The legal requirements imposed by the Geneva Conventions have been 
violated by the actions of U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison.69 In 
 60. MSNBC, 9/11 Panel Sees No Link Between Iraq, al-Qaida (June 16, 2004), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5223932 (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  
 Even if some indirect link had been found, the Charter indicates that the self-defense action must 
be taken directly against the country that launched the armed attack. Thus Iraq would still not be the 
correct target and would be outside the scope of Article 51. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 62. Geneva-POW, supra note 15. 
 63. Geneva-Civilian, supra note 15. 
 64. Geneva-Civilian, supra note 15, art. 31. “No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised 
against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.” Id. 
“Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or 
intimidation . . . .” Geneva-POW, supra note 15, art. 13. 
 65. See id. (“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated.”); Geneva-Civilian, supra 
note 15, art 27 (“They shall at all times be humanely treated.”). 
 66. Although it contains the phrase “in the case of an armed conflict not of an international 
character,” common Article 3 is customary international law providing a minimum set of rights during 
internal conflict and international armed conflict. See Jordan J. Paust, ASIL Insights: The U.S. as 
Occupying Power Over Portions of Iraq and Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, April 
2003, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh102.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
 67. Geneva-POW, supra note 15, art. 3(1)(a); Geneva-Civilian, supra note 15, art. 3(1)(a). 
 68. Geneva-POW, supra note 15, art. 3(1)(c); Geneva-Civilian, supra note 15, art. 3(1)(c). 
 69. At least eight criminal investigations into the conduct at Abu Ghraib have been launched or 
will begin in the near future. The report of Major-General Antonio Taguba, focusing on the actions of 
the 800th Military Police Brigade, found 
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addressing causes of and responsibility for these “grave breaches,”70 the 
Schlesinger Report71 determined that “[c]ommanding officers and their 
staffs at various levels failed in their duties and that such failures 
contributed directly or indirectly to detainee abuse.”72 The report further 
stated that “[c]ommand failures were compounded by poor advice 
provided by staff officers with responsibility for overseeing battlefield 
functions related to detention and interrogation operations. Military and 
civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of 
responsibility.”73 Finally, with respect to root causes of the abuse, the 
report stated that “policy processes were inadequate or deficient in certain 
respects at various levels”74 and that the Department of Defense did not do 
an adequate job of ensuring that more severe interrogation tactics utilized 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,75 did not spread to Iraq.76  
that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following 
acts: 
a. Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet; . . . 
c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing; 
d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a 
time; . . . 
g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; 
h. Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching 
wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture; 
i. Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-
year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked; . . . 
In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of abuse . . . 
a. Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; . . . 
d. Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; 
g. Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick . . .  
Major-General Antonio Taguba, Art. 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, 15-18, 
May 11, 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/taguba_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2005). 
 70. Geneva-Civilian, supra note 15, arts. 146–147 and Geneva-POW, supra note 15, arts. 129–
130 both define “grave breaches” of the provisions as those “involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment . . . willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.” 
 71. James R. Schlesinger et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention 
Operations (2004) [hereinafter Schlesinger Report]. This report was ordered by Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld and is the widest in scope of all the reports that focused on interrogation techniques, 
command structure and a timeline of the awareness of commanders of the abuses. 
 72. Id. at 43. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 33. 
 75. These methods included sleep deprivation, removal of all visual and auditory stimuli and 
inducing stress by use of detainee’s fears, among others. Memorandum from Office of President 
George W. Bush, to various press agencies (June 22, 2004) (detailing the approved interrogation 
techniques that were utilized at Guantanamo Bay).  
 76. Schlesinger Report, supra note 71, at 33–38. 
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That these interrogation tactics, approved by Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, were in opposition to the requirements of the Geneva 
Conventions should have been clear.77 However, rather than taking steps 
to ensure that such methods were limited to Guantanamo, the President 
issued a statement declaring (with respect to members of al-Qaeda) that he 
had “the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between 
the United States and Afghanistan.”78 This failure to address an obvious 
potential crime amounts to nothing more than willful blindness, which has 
never been held to be a defense.79 
The strongest rebuttal80 by the United States to a claim of illegality 
under the Geneva Conventions is that the acts of torture were not 
committed under any standing U.S. policy, but rather were the result of 
 77. For a detailed look at precisely what was authorized by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, see 
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of 
Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, Pentagon Working Group (2003), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/040403dad.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2005); Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, to Commander of US Southern Command Re: 
Guantanamo Interrogation Techniques (2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/041603rumsfeld.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Memo]; 
William J. Haynes II Memorandum Re: Counter-Resistance Techniques (2002), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dod.memos.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
 78. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to the Vice President of the United States et 
al., (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://pegc.no-ip.info/archive/White_HOuse/bush_memo_20020207_ 
ed.pdf (regarding “Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda detainees”). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1976)  
The substantive justification for the rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge 
are equally culpable. The textual justification is that in common understanding one “knows” 
facts of which he is less than absolutely certain. To act "knowingly," therefore, is not 
necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high 
probability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, 
“positive” knowledge is not required. 
 This is the analysis adopted in the Model Penal Code. Section 2.02(7) states: “When 
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is 
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist.” As the Comment to this provision explains, “Paragraph (7) 
deals with the situation British commentators have denominated ‘wilful blindness’ or 
‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of the probable existence of a material fact 
but does not satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist.” 
Id. 
 80. An additional argument that might be made in support of U.S. actions is that the President as 
Commander-in-Chief may choose to ignore international legal obligations. John Yoo, Trends in 
Global Governance: Do They Threaten American Sovereignty?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355 (2000). While 
an in-depth treatment of Professor Yoo’s arguments is outside the scope of this Note, it should be 
noted that such arguments are not persuasive here, as even Professor Yoo differentiates between 
customary international law and international treaty obligations. Id. at 371–73. While the universal 
application of the former might be debatable, the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with the latter 
illustrates that obligations stemming from valid treaties are binding. See supra notes 38–43 and 
accompanying text. 
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aberrant individuals, acting on their own.81 As such, the President would 
have had no reason to know of or to suspect such acts and therefore could 
not have been expected to take steps to prevent them.82 
This defense is tenuous at best. Several people have commented on an 
atmosphere of extra-legal actions83 that began with a memorandum from 
Alberto Gonzales to President Bush.84 This memo, urging the President to 
determine that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the Taliban, stated 
that a major benefit to such a determination would be to “[reduce] the 
threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the War Crimes Act.”85 This 
statement indicates that Gonzales was cognizant that these interrogation 
techniques might be declared torture and that he was therefore seeking to 
protect high-level governmental officials.86 Furthermore, this statement put 
the President on notice as to the types of techniques being used in 
Afghanistan, thus compelling him as Commander in Chief to make certain 
that such techniques were not being used in Iraq, where the Geneva 
Conventions undoubtedly would apply.87 
This breach of the responsibilities required under the Geneva 
Conventions is another direct failure to faithfully execute the laws of the 
United States. While this criminal prosecution seemingly requires more 
evidentiary hurdles than a prosecution under the U.N. Charter, it remains a 
 81. This is exactly the position first proffered by the administration. Eric Schmitt, Report Faults 
Individuals For Abuses in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A9 (describing the administration’s 
belief in an Army report that blamed the torture at Abu Ghraib on a few individuals).  
 82. See supra note 17 (regarding “knew or had reason to know” standard of command 
responsibility). 
 83. See, e.g., Mike Dorning, Prisoner Abuse Poses Peril for Bush, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 2004, at 
C9 (stating “when public statements, policy decisions and internal documents are examined in total, 
there is strong suggestion of an atmosphere set at the highest levels of government that contributed to 
mistreatment of detainees . . .”) (emphasis added); Editorial, Closer to the Truth, WASH. POST, Aug. 
26, 2004, at A22 (declaring “the crimes at Abu Ghraib were, in part, the result of the 2002 decision by 
the president [sic] and his top aides to set aside the Geneva Conventions as well as standard U.S. 
doctrines for the treatment of prisoners”). 
 84. Memorandum of Alberto Gonzales to the President of the United States, Jan. 25, 2004, 
available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 
Gonzales Memo]. This memo stated that President Bush had the “authority to determine that [the 
Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War] does not apply to the Taliban.” Id. 
It also urged the President to make such a determination in the interests of “preserv[ing] flexibility.” 
Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).  
 87. The subsequent statement of President Bush, supra note 78, echoing the sentiment of Alberto 
Gonzales indicates that he read the memo and, thus, should have been apprised of the techniques being 
used and the possible consequences arising therefrom if such techniques spread to Iraq. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/10
p235 Campbell book pages.doc2/28/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF A U.S. PRESIDENT 247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viable avenue nonetheless, with jurisdiction for the federal courts granted 
by the same provision of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.88 
C. Violation of Statutory Law Proscribing War Crimes 
At least two statutes exist that are applicable with respect to the 
President’s actions toward Iraq and which provide criminal penalties for 
international crimes. This Note will first address potential violations of the 
War Crimes Act of 199689 and then discuss similar violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340-2340A.90 
1. War Crimes Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.S. § 2441) 
Under the War Crimes Act of 1996,91 anyone who commits a war 
crime domestically or internationally and is either a member of the armed 
forces or is a U.S. citizen92 may be fined, imprisoned, or, in certain 
circumstances, executed.93 The statute further defines “war crimes” as  
any conduct (1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international 
conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to 
such convention to which the United States is a party; . . . [or] (3) 
which constitutes a violation of common article 3 of the 
international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949.94 
As outlined above95 and as further evinced by the ongoing trials of soldiers 
responsible for the torture at Abu Ghraib,96 the argument can be made that 
the actions at Abu Ghraib constitute either a “grave breach” under Article 
 88. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 89. See infra notes 91–109 and accompanying text. 
 90. See infra notes 110–23 and accompanying text. 
 91. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441 (Supp. 2005). 
 92. Id. § 2441(b) (“The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the person committing 
such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
or a national of the United States.”). Technically, given his role as Commander-in-Chief of the 
military, the President would qualify under either prong; however, this Note will only address the 
aspect of the President as a U.S. national. 
 93. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441(a). 
 94. Id. § 2441(c). 
 95. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes. 
 96. See, e.g., Jackie Spinner, Soldier Gets 1 Year in Abuse of Iraqis, WASH. POST, May 20, 2004, 
at A1 (detailing the trial of Specialist Jeremy Sivits); Jackie Spinner, Soldier Pleads Guilty to Prisoner 
Abuse, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at A24 (regarding trial of Specialist Armin Cruz); Jackie Spinner, 
MP Pleads Guilty to Abuses at Iraq Prison, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2004, at A1 (detailing the trial of 
Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick); The Associated Press, Soldier Charged with Abusing Iraqi Prisoners, 
May 7, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4927273/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) 
(describing charges against and upcoming court-martial of PFC Lynndie England). 
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130 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War97 or, at the very least, a breach of common Article 3 of the same.98 
Either of these breaches would be sufficient to trigger the criminal 
provisions of the War Crimes Act of 1996. 
The most likely prosecution of the President under the War Crimes Act 
of 1996 for the torture at Abu Ghraib would proceed under the doctrine of 
superior responsibility.99 Under this doctrine, if a leader “knew or had 
reason to know” that his subordinates had committed or were committing 
a war crime, the leader is under a duty to prevent the crime or punish the 
offenders.100 As discussed previously,101 beginning with the memorandum 
from Alberto Gonzales and continuing throughout the war and occupation 
of Iraq, there exists an atmosphere of extra-legal and illegal actions with 
respect to prisoners taken in the war on terror.102 Despite the pervasive 
 97. See description of “grave breaches,” supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 98. Geneva-POW, supra note 15, art. 3(1)(a)-(d). 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions: 
[the following acts are prohibited]: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; . . . 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment. 
Id. 
 99. There exist two other potential theories of responsibility: joint criminal enterprise and illegal 
orders. Both of these theories, however, are beyond the reach of this Note and therefore will not be 
addressed. For a more detailed discussion of these theories and their applicability, see Patricia M. 
Wald, General Radislav Krstic: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 445, 457 (2003) 
(detailing the definition and applicability of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise); Anthony 
D’Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility, 80 A.J.I.L. 604 (1986) (discussing the 
various implications of illegal orders). 
 100. See discussion supra note 17. Likewise, although the United States is not a signatory, 
Protocol I, which is considered to be part of customary international law, states:  
[t]he fact that a breach of the Conventions . . . was committed by a subordinate does not 
absolve his superiors from penal disciplinary responsibility . . . if they knew, or had 
information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, 
that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach. 
Protocol I, supra note 16, art. 86(2). The standard applied by U.S. courts when dealing with superior 
responsibility stems from the Supreme Court decision in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The 
Court created “Yamashita standard” in holding that General Yamashita, as commander of Japanese 
forces in the Philippines, was under an “affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his 
power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.” Id. 
at 16. Many cases over the next half century followed this standard, including Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 101. See supra notes 62–88 and accompanying text. 
 102. See discussion supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (regarding pervasive atmosphere of 
extra-legality in detention and interrogation of prisoners). 
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nature of this atmosphere and the President’s awareness of such actions, 
there is little to suggest that he “[took] all feasible measures within [his] 
power to prevent or repress the breach.”103 
The only rebuttal to this violation104 is that the Geneva Conventions do 
not apply to the prisoners at Abu Ghraib.105 The defense attorney for 
Major Clarke Paulus recently raised this defense, “assert[ing] that ‘non-
state combatants’ do not enjoy the guarantee of humane treatment covered 
by the Geneva Convention.”106 However, even if this defense could be 
applied to specific prisoners,107 it cannot be applied to the group as a 
whole, as many of the prisoners were members of the Army of Iraq and 
therefore prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.108 More 
importantly, the War Crimes Act of 1996 does not require that the Geneva 
Conventions actually apply only that the conduct be of such a nature that it 
would be a breach if it occurred under the Geneva Conventions.109  
In this sense, the statute creates a punishable offense for any violation 
of a standard defined by the Conventions, not constrained by them. 
Therefore, under the doctrine of superior responsibility, the war crimes 
 103. Protocol I, supra note 16, art. 86(2). 
 104. This Note earlier dismissed potential claims that the incidents were aberrations and were 
outside of the President’s potential control. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 105. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB: I. A POLICY TO EVADE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/2.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 
2005).  
Even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, Secretary Rumsfeld continued to take a loose view 
of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions. On May 5, 2004, he told a television 
interviewer the Geneva Conventions “did not apply precisely” in Iraq but were “basic rules” 
for handling prisoners. Visiting Abu Ghraib on May 14, Rumsfeld remarked, “Geneva 
doesn’t say what you do when you get up in the morning.” 
Id.  
 106. Tony Perry, Lawyer Cites Bush Ruling in Marine Prisoner Abuse Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2004, at B6. Attorney Keith Higgins claimed to be relying upon decisions by the White House and 
Department of Defense, that “the Geneva Convention apply only to soldiers and other fighters aligned 
with a legitimate government.” Id. 
 107. This is a tenuous assertion at best, as illustrated by the guilty verdict against Major Clarke 
Paulus despite this claimed defense. The Associated Press, Marine Guilty of Lesser Charges in Iraqi’s 
Death, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6456010/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2005).  
 108. Geneva-POW, supra note 15, art. 4(A)(1). 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of 
the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: 
1. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or 
volunteer corps forming part of such force. 
Id. 
 109. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441. “[T]he term ‘war crime’ means any conduct 
. . . defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 
1949.” Id. 
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committed at Abu Ghraib could be attributable to the President and 
constitute a triable violation of the War Crimes Act of 1996. 
2. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2340-2340A 
Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (“Torture Statute”), criminal liability is 
imposed upon anyone who commits torture,110 provided that person is a 
national of the United States.111 Much like prosecution under the War 
Crimes Act of 1996,112 prosecution of a President under the Torture 
Statute would most likely require the application of superior 
responsibility.113 The same analysis regarding the pervasive atmosphere of 
illegality would therefore apply to superior responsibility under this statute 
as well.114 
There are two possible defenses to a criminal charge under this statute. 
The first is the claim that the actions at Abu Ghraib do not amount to 
“torture” under the statute—a defense offered by the Gonzales memo.115 
Yet, despite the nuanced position urged by the memo, a plain language 
reading of the statute shows no such loophole.116 Rather, it merely requires 
that the act be “intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering.”117 This degree of pain or suffering is further defined as “the 
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from . . . the intentional 
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering.”118 
Given that some prisoners were killed as a result of the acts, the acts 
seemed to meet the prolonged harm requirement even under the most 
conservative reading of the Torture Statute.119 
 110. As used in section 2340A, “torture” is defined as “an act committed by a person acting under 
the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . upon 
another person within his custody or physical control.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(1). 
 111. Id.  
 112. See supra notes 17 and 100. 
 113. See discussion of joint criminal enterprise and illegal orders, supra note 99, for possible 
alternate theories of liability for torture committed at Abu Ghraib. 
 114. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 and accompanying notes. 
 115. See Gonzales Memo, supra note 84 (attempting to define the “pain” required for prosecution 
under section 2340A by stating that it must amount to “serious physical injury, such as organ failure, 
impairment or bodily function, or even death”). 
 116. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“It has also been observed 
that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect 
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”). 
 117. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(1). 
 118. Id. § 2340(2)(A). 
 119. The Gonzales memo even states as much. See Gonzales Memo, supra note 84. 
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The second possible defense to this allegation is that the Patriot Act120 
severely limited the reach of the Torture Statute. This is the position 
proffered in the Report on Detainee Interrogations.121 However, this 
assertion overlooks the fact that the Patriot Act only limited the Torture 
Statute with respect to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.122 The act served to 
“clarify jurisdiction over crimes committed against U.S. citizens on U.S. 
property abroad by extending U.S. criminal jurisdiction over certain 
crimes committed at its foreign diplomatic, military and other facilities, 
and by cross-reference excluded those places from the reach of Section 
2340A.”123 However, because Abu Ghraib prison was not U.S. property 
and because the torture was not committed against U.S. citizens, the 
Patriot Act leaves the Torture Statute’s application unaltered with respect 
to Iraq, and thus, fails as a defense to a charge of illegality against the 
President under the Statute. 
III. FORUM TWO: IRAQI FEDERAL COURTS 
The federal courts of Iraq, under three internationally accepted forms 
of jurisdiction, would have the power to try President Bush for war crimes 
committed upon Iraqi soil or against Iraqi citizens.124 In this section, this 
Note will first discuss potential immunity claims that might be raised.125 It 
will then focus on the factual basis for invoking certain types of 
jurisdiction.126 Finally, it will turn to the legal arguments for war crimes 
prosecution.127 
A. Dealing with Issues of Immunity 
On June 26, 2003, Paul Bremer, as head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), promulgated Order 17, which granted immunity to the 
 120. Pub. L. No. 107-5b, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 121. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE 
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 7-8 (2003) (explaining the application of the Patriot Act to § 2340A) 
[hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT]. 
 122. Id. at 8 (stating “[b]y its terms, the plain language of new subsection 9 includes Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Station (GTMO) within the definition of the SMTJ, and accordingly makes GTMO within 
the United States for the purposes of § 2340”). 
 123. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (REPORT ON TORTURE), available at 
http://www.cja.org/projects/ABA%20report.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2005). 
 124. See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 125. See infra notes 128–40 and accompanying text. 
 126. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 127. See infra notes 146–69 and accompanying text. 
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CPA and Coalition Forces.128 This immunity from process applied “only 
with respect to acts or omissions by them during the period of authority of 
the CPA.”129 
There seem to be two possible exceptions that would allow service of 
process against a U.S. President with respect to this immunity agreement. 
The first is the definition of “CPA Personnel” contained within Order 17, 
which states that this term is applicable to “all non-Iraqi civilian and 
military personnel assigned to or under the direction and control of the 
Administrator of the CPA.”130 This definition would encompass U.S. 
soldiers, but not the President, as he was not “under the control of the 
Administrator of the CPA” within the meaning of Order 17.131 
The second possible exception would be a nullification or repudiation 
of the agreement by the new Iraqi government. When the CPA turned over 
control of Iraq to the interim government on June 30, 2004,132 a Law of 
Administration for the State of Iraq (Administrative Law) was also put in 
place, vesting all foreign relations power in Iraq in the new government.133 
 128. Order 17, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17, § 2(1)-2(4), June 26, 
2003 [hereinafter CPA Order 17]. The order states 
1) CPA, Coalition Forces and Foreign Liaison Mission, their property, funds and assets of 
shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process. 
2) All Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall respect the Iraqi laws 
applicable to those Coalition personnel . . . in the territory of Iraq. 
3) All Coalition personnel shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Parent States 
and, the shall be immune from local criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from 
any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their Parent States. 
Id. 
 129. Id. at § 4. This “period of authority” was from May 11, 2003, to June 30, 2004. 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SERVICE, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN, 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 4–5 (2004), at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/ 
RL32370.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).  
 130. Id. § 1(1). 
 131. Also, because Order 17 is silent as to superior responsibility, it is unclear whether a superior 
who is not covered by the immunity agreement could be prosecuted in Iraq while the soldier who 
commits the violation leading to the superior’s prosecution could not. 
 132. Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraqi Interim Government Announcement 
Ceremony Press Packet, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/press_packet.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2005). 
 133. INTERIM CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, art. 25(A)–(B).  
The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the following matters: 
(A) Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and 
ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating foreign economic and trade policy 
and sovereign debt policies; 
(B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and maintaining 
armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of the country’s borders and to 
defend Iraq. 
Id. 
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While the Administrative Law further mentions that the laws enacted by 
the CPA shall remain in force until otherwise abrogated by the Interim 
Government,134 Article 3 expressly states that “[a]ny legal provision that 
conflicts with this Law is null and void.”135 Should the Interim 
Government’s Federal Supreme Court decide that the immunity granted by 
Order 17 created violations of the civil rights of Iraqis enumerated in 
Article 15,136 or that Order 17 itself was in violation of Article 43(D),137 
Order 17 would necessarily become null and void.138 Additionally, if the 
Order were not declared null, the Interim Government could still repudiate 
Order 17 either by amending the Administrative Law139 or by drafting the 
permanent Constitution in a manner that repudiates all orders enacted by 
the CPA.140 The remainder of the analysis will proceed under the 
assumption that one of these methods of overcoming the immunity granted 
by Order 17 would be successful. 
B. Dealing with Issues of Jurisdiction 
“[T]here are five traditional bases of jurisdiction over extra-territorial 
crimes under international law.” These are territorial, national, protective, 
universal,141 and passive-personal jurisdiction. Iraq could arguably 
 134. Id. art. 26(C) (stating “[t]he laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until 
rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law”). 
 135. Id. art. 3(B). 
 136. Id. art. 15(C) (“No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be detained 
by reason of political or religious beliefs.”); Id. art. 15(J) (“Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, 
shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”). 
 137. Id. art. 43(D) (“Federal courts shall adjudicate matters that arise from the application of 
federal laws.”). 
 138. Id. art. 44(C) (“Should the Federal Supreme Court rule that a challenged law, regulation, 
directive, or measure is inconsistent with this Law, it shall be deemed null and void.”). 
 139. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ, supra note 19, art. 3(A) (“No amendment to this Law may 
be made except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the 
unanimous approval of the Presidency Council.”) The Presidency Council is created when “[t]he 
National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two Deputies.” Id. art. 36(A). 
 140. Id. art. 60.  
The National Assembly shall write a draft of the permanent constitution of Iraq. This 
Assembly shall carry out this responsibility in part by encouraging debate on the constitution 
through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the media, and 
receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution. 
Id. As of this writing, the shape and content of the Iraqi Constitution under the new government is still 
up in the air, as rival religious factions argue over representation and perceived amounts of power 
within the new system. See, e.g., Associated Press, More changes Possible for Iraqi Constitution, 
available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/world/3331024 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
 141. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating “jurisdiction is 
conferred in any forum that obtains physical custody of the perpetuator of certain offenses considered 
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exercise jurisdiction under the territorial principle, as the crimes occurred 
in Iraq;142 the protective principle, assuming Iraq asserted that the health 
and safety of its citizenry and the sovereignty of its State were viable 
national interests;143 and the passive-personality principle, as the victims 
of any crimes at Abu Ghraib were Iraqi citizens.144 Practically, territorial 
jurisdiction would make the most sense, as there is no doubt that the 
crimes occurred on Iraqi soil.145 
C. War Crimes 
The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court146 (“Rome 
Statute”) is considered to be the most recent codification of customary 
international law.147 As such, the statute contains prohibitions against 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,148 “[d]eclaring abolished, 
suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the 
nationals of the hostile party,”149 and “outrages upon personal dignity.”150 
particularly heinous and harmful to humanity”). 
 142. Id. at 899 (“[J]urisdiction is based on the place where the offense is committed . . .”). 
 143. Id. at 900 (“[J]urisdiction is based on whether the national interest is injured . . .”). 
 144. Id. (“[J]urisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim.”). Also, though unnecessary in 
this case due to the availability of other, less controversial bases of jurisdiction, Iraq could assert 
jurisdiction under the universal principle, as torture is generally accepted as a jus cogens crime. See 
generally Jus Cogens, supra note 20. 
 145. DUNOFF, supra note 16, at 334. 
States have claimed a number of bases for the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, with 
varying degrees of international acceptance. The most commonly used and accepted is the 
“territorial principle,” under which a state has jurisdiction to make law applicable to all 
persons and property within its territory. As Chief Justice Marshall said in Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 146. Rome Statute, supra note 16. Although the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, it 
has not challenged the stated laws, but rather the jurisdictional elements of the court. Max Du Plessis, 
The Universal Aspirations of the International Criminal Court: A Short Comment on the American 
Position, 11 AFR. SECURITY REV. no. 4, 115–16 (2002). 
 147. Matthew Lippman, The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 139 (2000). The Rome Statute is considered “the culmination of almost fifty years of debate, 
discussion and judicial decisions concerning the principle of command responsibility.” Id. at 139. 
Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, 835 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531, 553 (Sept. 30, 1999), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review?openDocument (follow “1999-No. 835” hyperlink, then click the name of 
article). “This great corpus of principles and rules, all this legal heritage has now been codified in an 
organic way in a single instrument, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
adopted by a UN diplomatic conference on 17 July 1998.” Id. 
 148. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 8(2)(a)(i)-(iii),(vi) (prohibiting “wilful killing,” “[t]orture or 
inhuman treatment,” “wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health,” and 
“unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement”). 
 149. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xiv). 
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The Rome Statute further explains that these laws apply equally to all, 
without regard for “official capacity as a Head of State or Government.”151 
Moreover, under customary international law, a superior is criminally 
liable for the acts of subordinates when he knew of the crime, could have 
prevented it, and failed to take all measures available to him to prevent the 
crime or prosecute the offenders.152 Arguably, with respect to the actions 
in Iraq, the President is in violation of all prohibitions outlined in the 
Rome Statute.  
First, the incidents at Abu Ghraib, if assumed to be part of an 
“atmosphere” of extra-legal activity towards prisoners of war,153 were 
violative of the Geneva Conventions’ provisions against willful killing, 
torture, causation of suffering, and unlawful confinement.154 Second, the 
recent “conclusion” by the administration that the Geneva Conventions do 
not apply in Iraq155 would not be in accordance with Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute’s prohibition on the suspension of the rights of prisoners.156 
Finally, the methods created for interrogation at Guantanamo157 that were 
ultimately utilized at Abu Ghraib were not in accordance with the 
prohibition on degrading treatment of prisoners.158 Each of these violations 
rises to the level of war crimes as defined by the Rome Statute and 
 150. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) (prohibiting “[c]ommitting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment”). 
 151. Id. art. 27(1). “This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government . . . shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute. . . .” Id. 
 152. Id. art. 28(b)(i)-(iii).  
With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph 1 [detailing 
military superior responsibility], a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority 
and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
subordinates, where: (a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; (b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and 
control of the superior; and (c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
Id. 
 153. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 155. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Action Bars Rights of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, 
at A1 (stating that “the Bush Administration has concluded for the first time that some non-Iraqi 
prisoners captured by American forces in Iraq are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions”). 
 156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Rumsfeld Memo 1, supra note 77. 
 158. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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customary international law; thus, both direct responsibility and superior 
responsibility crimes exist within Iraqi court jurisdiction. 
Under the superior responsibility doctrine, the crimes at Abu Ghraib 
could be criminally attributable to the President because he either knew or 
had reason to known that such methods were approved in some 
interrogations and might spread to Iraq if not carefully controlled.159 
Because the Administration was in charge of creating the interrogation 
methods used at Abu Ghraib,160 President Bush arguably had effective 
control over the interrogators.161 Moreover, it seems that no efforts were 
made to prevent the crimes, as no actions were taken to ensure that Iraqi 
interrogations were done in accordance with international law.162  
The President would be able to avoid some criminal responsibility for 
the acts of torture and degradation if it is shown that he took every 
available step to ensure proper investigation and prosecution of the 
perpetrators. However, this showing would only absolve him of the 
superior responsibility crimes, still leaving him liable for the declaration 
that Geneva Rights were suspended in Iraq and for his tacit approval of the 
interrogation methods. 
The likely rebuttals to these charges would be immunities claimed 
under either customary international law or under the immunity agreement 
between the United States and the Interim Government of Iraq.163 Under 
customary international law, it might be asserted that the President is 
immune from liability for acts done in his official capacity as head of 
state. However, such a defense ignores the fact that, under Congo v. 
 159. See supra notes 17 and 100 (detailing superior responsibility doctrine and “knew or had 
reason to know” standard). 
 160. See supra note 27. 
 161. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) found that the 
principle of superior responsibility is applicable anywhere a superior has effective control, whether de 
facto or de jure, over the persons committing the underlying violations of international humanitarian 
law. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 378 (Nov. 16, 1998). “[T]he Trial Chamber 
accordingly shares the view expressed by the International Law Commission that the doctrine of 
superior responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the extent that they exercise a degree of 
control over their subordinates which is similar to that of military commanders.” Id. Furthermore, a 
civilian superior “may possess the mens rea required to incur criminal liability where . . . he had in his 
possession information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such 
offenses by indicating the need for additional investigation . . .” Id. ¶ 383. The ICTY ultimately held 
“that a superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such measures that are 
within his powers.” Id. ¶ 395. 
 162. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersch, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program came to 
Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
fact/content/?040524fa_fact (detailing the administrative failures which led to Guantanamo techniques 
being used at Abu Ghraib) (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
 163. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text (discussing language of and immunities 
stemming from the agreement). 
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Belgium,164 this immunity extends—at best—to the President’s tenure of 
office.165 Once out of office, he may still be punished for illegal activities 
committed during his tenure.166 Second, with respect to the immunity 
agreement,167 where the crimes being committed are of a jus cogens 
nature,168 it is generally not possible to treaty out of the obligation not to 
commit them.169 Thus, even if the immunity agreement could be overcome 
as outlined above, the immunity granted to the United States by the 
Interim Government would not extend to torture and other jus cogens 
violations.170 
IV. FORUM THREE: A THIRD-PARTY STATE 
Under the principle of universality, a third-party nation could prosecute 
the President for crimes that were jus cogens in nature.171 Such universal 
jurisdiction arguably extends to acts of international aggression.172 This 
Note will address prosecution by a third-party nation by discussing the 
factual and jurisprudential basis for universal jurisdiction.173 This section 
will then conclude by detailing aggression as an international crime and 
the applicability of this crime with respect to the actions in Iraq.174 
A. Dealing with Issues of Jurisdiction 
The line of jurisprudence expounding universal jurisdiction as a basis 
for allowing third-party nations to try those accused of violations of jus 
 164. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium) 2002, I.C.J No. 121 (Feb. 14) (majority opinion). 
 165. Id. ¶ 54 (stating “the Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign 
Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability”). 
 166. Id. ¶ 60 (declaring “the Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction 
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect 
of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity”). 
 167. See CPA Order 17, supra note 128. 
 168. Jus Cogens, supra note 20, at 68. “[C]ertain crimes affect the interests of the world 
community as a whole because they threaten the peace and security of humankind and because they 
shock the conscience of humanity. If both elements are present in a given crime, it can be concluded 
that it is part of jus cogens.” Id. at 69 (footnote omitted). 
 169. Id. at 65. “[T]he implications of jus cogens are those of a duty and not of optional rights; 
otherwise jus cogens would not constitute a peremptory norm of international law. Consequently, these 
obligations are non-derogable in times of war as well as peace.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 170. See supra notes 128–40 and accompanying text dealing with Order 17 immunities. 
 171. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 172. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 173. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
 174. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
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cogens norms illustrates both a strong trend in favor of universality175 and 
the United States’ acceptance of such jurisdiction.176 This jurisdictional 
doctrine began to develop in its modern form during the Nurenberg trials 
following World War II.177 In The Trial of the Major War Criminals, the 
International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) stated “[the Signatory Powers] 
have done together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is 
not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts 
to administer law.”178 This universality was held to apply to three general 
types of crimes outlined by the Nuremberg Charter—crimes against peace 
(which included aggression),179 war crimes,180 and crimes against 
humanity.181 By embracing universal jurisdiction in response to the 
heinous acts of the Nazi party prior to and during World War II, the IMT 
illustrated that the importance was not where the criminals were tried, but 
rather that they were tried.182 This principle of universality remains a form 
of jurisdiction recognized both internationally and domestically to this 
day.  
Internationally, courts have invoked universal jurisdiction in recent 
years in countries such as Belgium,183 Australia,184 and Switzerland.185 
 175. See infra notes 176–84. 
 176. See infra notes 185–90. 
 177. At postwar meetings the victorious Allies agreed on the creation of an International Military 
Tribunal to punish those responsible for war crimes during World War II. CIAO-Atlas—Germany, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/atlas/countries/de_data_loc.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005). 
 178. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military (Nuremberg, Germany 
1948).  
 179. “[N]amely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.” Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286 [hereinafter IMT Charter]. 
 180. “[N]amely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include . . . 
murder, . . . ill-treatment of prisoners of war . . . , killing of hostages.” Id.  
 181. Id. Crimes against humanity are generally crimes directed against a civilian population as 
part of a widespread and/or systemic attack based on some identifiable trait common to the group (i.e. 
race, gender). Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 7(1)-(3). However, any discussion of such crimes 
within Iraq is beyond the scope of this Note. Thus, all discussion under universal jurisdiction will be 
limited to crimes against the peace (aggression) and war crimes. 
 182. In his opening statement to the IMT, Robert Jackson explained the importance of what was to 
transpire. Justice Jackson’s Opening Statement for the Prosecution, The Nuremberg Trials, available 
at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/Jackson.html (last visited Sept. 26, 
2005) [hereinafter Jackson]. 
What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent sinister influences that 
will lurk in the world long after their bodies have returned to dust. . . . They are symbols of 
fierce nationalisms and of militarism, of intrigue and war-making . . . Civilization can afford 
no compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength if we deal 
ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously survive. 
Id. 
 183. Crim. Chambre du Conseil 22 juillet 1996 (applying universal jurisdiction in the trial of a 
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Within the United States, federal courts have continued to apply and 
further define universal jurisdiction. For example, in Princz v. Federal 
Republic of Germany,186 the court explained the United States’ 
interpretation of the concept, stating “[u]nder the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, for certain offenses . . . a state can exercise jurisdiction over 
an offender in custody even if that state has neither a territorial link to the 
offense nor any connection to the nationality of the victim or offender.”187 
The court also described the continued applicability of such jurisdiction, 
holding “[t]he exercise of jurisdiction over the Nazi officials at Nuremberg 
was by no means a single aberration in international law.”188 
More recently, in United States v. Yunis,189 the court applied universal 
jurisdiction as created by a treaty, explaining 
under the universal principle, states may proscribe and prosecute 
“certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of 
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or 
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts 
of terrorism,” even absent any special connection between the state 
and the offense.190 
Thus, from Nuremberg to the present, the United States has not 
hesitated to apply universal jurisdiction.191 
Rwandese citizen for crimes committed during the conflict and ensuing genocide in Rwanda). 
 184. Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth of Australia (1991), 172 CLR 501, 561–65 (Austl.) 
(applying universal jurisdiction stemming from war crimes in World War II to former Ukrainian 
citizen). 
 185. Tribunal militaire de Cass., 8 juillet 1996 (applying universal jurisdiction in the trial of a 
Rwandan citizen accused of genocide). 
 186. 26 F.3d at 1166. 
 187. Id. at 1182 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of universal jurisdiction as recently as July 
2004. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 189. 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
 190. Id. at 1091 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 404, 423 (1987)). 
 191. For additional discussion and application of universal jurisdiction, see Demjanjuk v. 
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985). “International law recognizes a ‘universal jurisdiction’ over 
certain offenses . . . based on the assumption that some crimes are so universally condemned that the 
perpetrators are the enemies of all people.” Id. at 582. Though the issue at hand in Demjanjuk was a 
question of extradition treaty interpretation, the court used broad strokes in painting its definition of 
universal jurisdiction and was in no way limiting the application of such jurisdiction whenever jus 
cogens norms have been violated. The Sixth Circuit stated that, when the crimes are of a jus cogens 
nature, “any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them . . .” Id. The court 
continued, “[w]hen proceeding on that jurisdictional premise, neither the nationality of the accused or 
the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is significant.” Id. at 582–83. Rather, “[t]he underlying 
assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of nations or against humanity and that the 
prosecuting nation is acting for all nations. This being so, . . . any nation . . . may undertake to 
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B. Aggression as an International Crime 
According to the IMT, “[t]o initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only 
an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only 
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil 
of the whole.”192 Although there is not a single, universally accepted 
definition of what constitutes aggression,193 there is support for the idea 
that aggression constitutes a jus cogens crime, to which universal 
jurisdiction would necessarily apply.194 Moreover, this lack of a single 
definition of aggression has not prevented courts from finding or 
international organizations from recognizing such acts as an international 
crime.  
Domestically, in Aboitiz & Co. v. Price,195 the court stated bluntly 
“[t]he Japanese occupation was an act of unprovoked aggression. It was an 
international crime. It was outside and in violation of international law.”196 
More recently, in Nicaragua v. United States,197 the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) equated aggression to an unprovoked armed attack.198 
While the United States eventually revoked its acceptance of the optional 
clause giving the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction in such matters, the validity 
of this judgment remains intact.199 Similarly, though the drafters were 
vindicate the interest of all nations by seeking to punish the perpetrators . . .” Id. at 583. 
 192. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 
172, 186 (1947). 
 193. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal 
Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 392 (explaining “the international community has 
been unable to achieve consensus as to what the elements of the crime of aggression are, and when 
criminal responsibility for the offense should attach”). 
 194. See Jus Cogens, supra note 20, at 68 (stating “[t]he legal literature discloses that the 
following international crimes are jus cogens: aggression”); G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 
2319th plen. mtg. at 3 (arts. 1, 3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) (adopted by the General 
Assembly to provide a consistent U.N. definition of aggression). 
 195. 99 F. Supp. 602 (Utah 1951). 
 196. Id. at 612. 
 197. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 198. Id. at 103. The I.C.J. ultimately held 
There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as 
constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed 
attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an 
international border, but also “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to” (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, “or 
its substantial involvement therein”. This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of 
the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be 
taken to reflect customary international law. 
Id. 
 199. See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Role of the World Court in Settling International 
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unable to agree on the precise meaning, the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court includes aggression among the crimes for 
which it has jurisdiction.200 All of this suggests that aggression is widely 
accepted as a jus cogens crime, subject to universal jurisdiction. 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq rises to the level of aggression. As outlined 
above,201 the U.S. attack upon Iraq was not done in self-defense, as the 
President did not claim it to be in response to September 11th and the 9/11 
Commission found no ties between the World Trade Center/Pentagon 
attacks and Saddam Hussein.202 As the man ultimately responsible for 
launching this act of aggression, President Bush would be criminally liable 
in the national court of any nation that obtained custody of him under 
universal jurisdiction for violation of a peremptory norm of international 
conduct.203 Further, in keeping with the rules set forth at Nuremberg, 
President Bush’s role as head of state would not immunize him from 
service or prosecution.204 
The strongest defense to a charge of aggression would be to claim 
aggression as a crime is too poorly defined to be a valid charge.205 
Disputes: A Recent Assessment, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1–3 (1997). 
 200. Sadat & Carden, supra note 193, at 392. “Although many fervently argued that omitting 
aggression from the ICC’s jurisdiction would mark a retreat from the Nuremberg principles, others 
countered that its inclusion could scuttle the Court entirely. Through a clever compromise, the Rome 
Statute includes aggression, but leaves it undefined and, therefore, unimplemented for the time being.” 
Id. “The Statute does not define aggression. Article 5(2) provides that the Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over that crime once it has been defined. . . . The definition of aggression must be adopted 
in accordance with articles 121 and 123 of the Statute, which detail the process of amending the 
Statute.” Id. at 405 n.137. 
 201. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 203. Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How 
Has It Affected the Development of a Principle of Universal Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All 
States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 63, 65 (2003). The statutes creating the 
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia “presuppose individual responsibility for offenses that 
are now viewed as crimes against the entire international community. Individuals who commit these 
crimes are regarded as hostis humanii generis, enemies of all mankind, a term once applied only to 
pirates and slave traders.” Id.  
 204. IMT Charter, supra note 179, art. 7. Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter states “[t]he official 
position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government departments, 
shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.” Id. This 
proclamation has been echoed many times. See, e.g., Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, Judgment of Hope of Craighead, (H.L. 1998-99) 
(appeal taken from Q.B. Div’l Ct.) (stating there is no head of state immunity with respect “to acts the 
prohibition of which has acquired the status under international law of jus cogens. This compels all 
states to refrain from such conduct under any circumstances and imposes an obligation erga omnes to 
punish such conduct.”). 
 205. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text for a discussion of other possible defenses 
and the rebuttals to these. 
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However, as already demonstrated,206 this is not true, as the President was 
aware of his potential violations.207 Aggression is well-defined enough to 
have been used in multiple cases, from Nuremberg to the present day.208 
Moreover, in prosecuting jus cogens crimes, it is important that the lack of 
a single definition not delay justice, because “even if any specific 
definition of aggression fails to achieve the status of customary 
international law, the principle of non-aggression is jus cogens, a 
peremptory norm that binds all nations equally.”209 Failure to conform to 
this norm is a crime, regardless of which definition is used. 
V. CONCLUSION 
That certain actions taken by the United States during the invasion of 
Iraq were illegal is beyond question. The only uncertainty that remains is 
determining who should be punished for these acts. As shown in this Note, 
strong cases can be made both domestically and internationally for 
bringing criminal charges against President Bush.210 Whether through 
 206. See supra notes 191–99 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., Torture and International Human Rights: A Roundtable Discussion with Francis 
Boyle, Michael Mandel, Liz Holtzman, H. Victor Conde, and Mark Levine, Jan. 9, 2005, 
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=80&ItemID=6987 (last visited Sept. 26, 
2005) (declaring that President Bush knew prior to the attack that such acts were illegal under 
international law as crimes of aggression). Many international scholars have been blunt in discussing 
the illegality of these acts of aggression, stating 
[t]he President was made aware of this by a great number of international lawyers around the 
world before the invasion, and even if he claimed ignorance, I'm sure he's heard that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. Bush and his administration and the US commanders 
involved are all guilty of this supreme crime. Since the war was unlawful, the many 
thousands of deaths predictably resulting from it are also crimes, murder in fact, for which 
Bush and his officials and commanders are guilty in flagrante. 
Id. 
 208. See supra notes 191–99 and accompanying text. 
 209. Sadat & Carden, supra note 193, at 437 n.341. 
 210. In reality, however, the likelihood of any of these for actually bringing charges is minute. 
First, there is not enough of an outcry in the United States to compel the Attorney General to bring 
such charges, as a failed attempt to prosecute the President would amount to political suicide. Second, 
as the new Iraqi government is dependent on the United States for monetary and military support for 
the foreseeable future, they would be foolish to attempt to bring charges—any justice which might be 
served would likely not outweigh the near certain collapse of the fledgling government. See, e.g., 
CNN.com, U.S. Likely to Bear Most of the Cost of Iraq War (Mar. 19, 2003) at http://money.cnn.com/ 
2003/03/17/news/economy/war_cost/ (estimating the total cost of the war, occupation and rebuilding 
of Iraq around $1.92 trillion) (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); Bradley Graham, Army Plans to Keep Iraq 
Troop Level Through 2006, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at Al, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33540-2005Jan24.html (explaining U.S. plans to keep at least 
120,000 troops in Iraq through 2006)(last visited Sept. 24, 2005). 
 Finally, there is no international consensus toward punishing Bush as there was with Augusto 
Pinochet. Regina v. Bartle, judgment of Hope of Craighead. Without such worldwide outcry, it is 
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direct responsibility for statutory crimes,211 dereliction of constitutional 
duties,212 or the launching of an aggressive war,213 or under superior 
responsibility for the acts of torture committed at Abu Ghraib,214 any of 
the three fora discussed herein can create a sound legal argument for 
prosecution. Moreover, every proffered justification for the illegal acts 
seems unpersuasive. In the face of such illegality,  
[t]he common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop 
with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also 
reach men who possess themselves of great power and make 
deliberate and concerted use of it to set in motion evils which leave 
no home in the world untouched.215 
Matthew D. Campbell*
difficult to conceive of a nation risking unknown reaction by levying such charges or even by 
attempting to obtain custody. 
 211. See supra Part II.C.1–2 and accompanying notes. 
 212. See supra Part II.B.1–2 and accompanying notes. 
 213. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
 214. See supra Part III.C and accompanying notes. 
 215. Jackson, supra note 182, at 98. 
 * J.D. Candidate (2006), Washington University School of Law. I would like to thank everyone 
who helped me in developing this Note. I would especially like to thank Professor Leila Sadat for her 
guidance in the planning and initial drafts.  
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